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(2012),	 Kitchin	 (2015),	 Marvin	 et	 al.	 (2016),	 Rose	 (2015),	 and	 Sassen	 (2012)	 have	 critiqued	 the	
technologically	deterministic	 language	of	smart	city	 rhetoric,	 focusing	on	the	 fact	 that	 it	 tends	 to	
focus	on	ICT	solutions	that	are	applied	top-down.	The	smart	city	agenda	rarely	addresses	issues	of	
social	differences	in	already-existing	cities	(Datta,	2018),	and	this	chapter	argues	that	it	is	critical	to	
reflect	 on	 a	 question	 raised	 by	March	 and	 Ribera-Fumaz	 (2014,	 p.	 826):	 “whose	 smartness	 and	
whose	 cities?”.	 The	 smart	 city	 approach	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 technological	 solutions	 to	 urban	
problems	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 states	 and	 companies,	 whereas	 these	 technologies	 “need	 to	
serve	and	work	for	people	and	communities	…	 in	relation	to	setting	 local	civic	and	 infrastructural	
priorities”	 (Sadoway	&	 Shekhar,	 2014).	 Although	 citizen	 consultation	 and	 participation	 are	 often	
described	 in	 smart	 city	 proposals,	 there	 is	 a	 marked	 dearth	 of	 effective	 mechanisms	 and	
technologies	 for	public	engagement	with	respect	 to	 issues	of	distribution	of	urban	resources	and	
amenities	 such	 as	 water,	 roads,	 street	 lights,	 drainage,	 waste	 services,	 and	 proposed	 smart	
solutions	to	them.	In	the	Global	South	context,	India	is	a	key	actor	in	implementing	a	national	level	
smart	city	project	that	arguably	leads	to	the	exacerbation	of	existing	urban	historical,	material	and	
social	 inequalities	 (Datta,	 2018;	 Ravindran,	 2015;	 Sadoway	 &	 Shekhar,	 2014;	 Vanolo,	 2014.	 The	
actual	 impacts	 of	 smart	 city	 projects	 include	 the	 displacement	 of	 informal	 groups	 from	 urban	
space,	displacement	and	spatial	segregation	through	land-use	planning,	reinforcing	digital	divides,	
gender	 disparities,	 and	 exclusion	 from	 the	 economic	 benefits	 of	 development.	 Therefore,	 taking	
the	 right	 to	 the	city	as	a	 framework,	 the	chapter	 represents	an	attempt	 to	answer	 the	question:	
‘Whose	right	to	the	smart	city’?		
	 The	chapter	focuses	attention	on	some	of	those	excluded	by	smart	city	projects	-	the	urban	
poor,	 street	 traders	 and	 those	 who	 live	 in	 informal	 settlements.	 It	 draws	 on	 empirical	 work	
undertaken	in	India,	Brazil	and	UK,	focusing	in	particular	on	an	examination	of	how	Chennai	in	India	
is	 planning	 and	 implementing	 a	 smart	 city	 vision.	 Here,	 the	 India	 Smart	 Cities	Mission	 (2016),	 a	
nationwide	smart	city	project	programme,	shows	evidence	of	driving	inequalities	by	bringing	about	
‘enclave’	development	that	inordinately	benefits	private	sector	actors	such	as	global	ICT	companies	
and	wealthier	 populations	 over	 others	 (Datta,	 2015).	We	 outline	 two	ways	 in	 which	 people	 are	
denied	 a	 right	 to	 the	 smart	 city:	 firstly	 through	 the	 proposed	 optimization,	 automation	 and	
privatization	of	urban	services	that	seeks	to	centralize	and	drive	out	low	paid	and	informal	labour	
force;	and	secondly	through	cleansing	and	expulsion	from	the	street	space	of	street	hawkers	and	
those	 operating	 in	 the	 informal	 urban	 economy.	Although	 this	was	 a	 small	 scale	 and	 short	 term	
study,	similar	patterns	of	exclusion	 from	participation	and	benefit	 from	the	smart	city	have	been	






the	 “right	 to	 participation”:	 “the	 right	 of	 all	 city	 dwellers	 to	 fully	 enjoy	 urban	 life	with	 all	 of	 its	







management,	that	 is,	 the	democratic	control	of	the	economy	and	politics;	 the	right	to	public	and	
non-public	services.	Rather	than	being	an	institutional	right,	such	as	the	right	to	vote,	the	right	to	
the	city	 is	rather	something	practiced	by	 living	out	the	routines	of	everyday	urban	life.	Lefebvre's	
analysis	 further	 proposes	 a	 generalized	 form	of	 self-management	 as	 the	 basis	 and	 expression	 of	
that	right	(2003:	150).		
	 Lefebvre	 links	 the	 right	 to	 the	 city	 with	 the	 spatial	 concepts	 of	 the	 centre	 and	 the	
periphery.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 centre	 creates	 a	 condition	 for	 the	 simultaneous	 presence	 of	 very	
different	worlds	and	value-systems,	of	ethnic,	cultural,	and	social	groups,	activities,	and	knowledge.	
The	 city	 is	 a	 social	 resource	 that	 creates	 the	 possibility	 of	 bringing	 together	 these	 different	
elements	 and	 making	 them	 productive	 as	 an	 essential	 device	 of	 the	 organization	 of	 society	
(Schmid,	 2011).	 In	 a	 Lefebvrian	 framework,	 the	 centre	 can	 thus	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 place	 where	
“differences	 encounter,	 acknowledge,	 and	 explore	 one	 another,	 and	 affirm	 or	 cancel	 out	 one	
another;	‘the	right	to	difference’”(Lefebvre,	1996a,	p.34):	
		 “The	right	to	the	city	complimented	by	the	right	to	difference	and	information	…	the	





exclusion	 from	 centrality.	 Therefore,	 exclusion	 is	 not	 just	 an	 effect	 caused	 by	 urbanization	
processes,	 but	 a	 much	 more	 fundamental	 rupture	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 city	 and	 its	
citizens.	 Lefebvre	 outlines	 how	 exclusion	 is	 based	 upon	 segregation	 “which	 rejects	 towards	
peripheral	 spaces	all	 those	who	do	not	participate	 in	political	privileges.	Equally,	 it	 stipulates	 the	
right	to	meetings	and	gathering”	(Lefebvre,	1996b,	p.30).	This	 is	reflected	 in	urban	space	not	 just	
through	 ownership	 of	 property	 but	 through	 habitation	 in	 public	 space;	 city	 streets,	 parks	 and	
squares.	According	to	Friedman,	“a	city	can	truly	be	called	a	city	only	when	its	streets	belong	to	the	
people”	 (1993,	 p.39).	 Therefore,	 urban	 planning,	 or	 regeneration	 projects	 become	 critical	
processes	where	 rights	 are	 either	 embedded	or	 challenged.	 In	 fact,	Harvey	 (2012,	 p.40)	 outlines	
how	the	right	to	the	city	is	the	right	to	control	the	urbanization	process	and	to	institute	new	modes	
of	urbanization.	

















a	 new	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	 authorities,	 between	 governments	 themselves	 and	
common	residents	through	better	ways	of	communication	and	improved	systems	and	services.	This	
can	happen	on	a	range	of	levels.	At	a	very	basic	level,	cities	can	be	seen	as	a	local	social	information	
infrastructure,	 providing	 information	 about	 the	 ‘real’	 city	 to	 inhabitants.	 In	 a	 model	 of	 civic	
engagement	and	participation,	smart	technologies	and	systems	are	seen	to	enable	new	modes	of	
citizenship.	 There	 is	 much	 debate	 as	 to	 whether	 these	 new,	 digital	 forms	 of	 governance	 and	
participation	actually	deliver	the	active	level	of	participation	that	they	promise	or	whether	in	fact	
they	 are	 just	 as	 limited	 in	 their	 approach	 as	 traditional	 models	 of	 governance	 (Willis	 &	 Aurigi,	
2017).		
	 The	gap	between	the	rhetoric	of	the	smart	city	around	governance	and	the	reality	of	what	
is	 delivered	 has	 been	 highlighted	 by	 authors	 such	 as	 Kitchin	 (2015,	 p.132)	 who	 points	 out	 that	
“smart	city	advocates	imagine	themselves	as	creating	technologies,	techniques	and	visions	that	are	
scientific,	 objective,	 commonsensical	 and	 apolitical.”	 Whilst	 digital	 technologies	 and	 platforms	
might	often	be	presented	as	 ‘tools’	 that	enable	certain	 forms	of	participation	and	governance,	 in	
fact	 they	 are	 far	 from	neutral	 and	 introduce	 new	models	 of	 democratic	 engagement	 in	 the	 city.	
Indeed,	 underlying	 much	 smart	 city	 visioning	 is	 a	 new	 model	 of	 urban	 management	 that	 is	
delivered	 through	 an	 efficiency	 paradigm	 for	 city	 services	 (IBM,	 2012).	 Gathering,	 accessing	 and	
analysing	urban	data	is	championed	as	a	process	which	leads	not	just	to	‘solving’	city	problems	but	
saving	money,	 time	 and	 resources	 as	 highlighted	 in	 IBM’s	 early	marketing	 strategies	 around	 the	
smart	 city.	 The	 premise	 of	 these	 management	 systems	 is	 that	 ‘smart’	 delivers	 a	 more	 efficient	
management	 of	 city	 infrastructure,	 which	 in	 turn	 delivers	 better	 governance	 through	 better	
services.	 This	 should	 enable	 a	 more	 inclusive	 pattern	 of	 participation	 in	 smart	 city	 projects.	
However,	 this	 discourse	 is	 also	 opening	 up	 new	 tensions	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	public	 and	
private	 sector	 in	 the	 management	 of	 cities.	 For	 example,	 IBM’s	 and	 other	 corporate	 IT	 firms’	
strategies	 are	 designed	 going	 to	 establish	 these	 companies	 as	 partners	 in	 the	 delivery	 of	 future	
smart	development.	The	promise	of	participation	offered	within	these	new	coalitions	of	public	and	
private	 actors	masks	 an	 economic	 imperative	where	 the	 actual	 beneficiary	 of	 the	 smart	 city	 are	
often	 the	 corporate	 partners	 rather	 than	 citizens.	 The	 reality	 can	 be	 quite	 different,	 as	 Kitchin	
(2015,	p.	132)	highlights:	
Left	 untouched	 are	 issues	 such	 as	 panoptic	 surveillance,	 technocratic	 and	 corporate	
forms	 of	 governance,	 technological	 lock-ins,	 profiling	 and	 social	 sorting,	 anticipatory	





















marginalized	 citizens.	 The	 technological	 efficiency	 model	 in	 fact	 catalyses	 a	 process	 which,	 in	
practice,	 further	 excludes	 those	 at	 the	margins.	 This	 challenges	 the	 “right	 to	 participate”	 in	 the	
Lefebvrian	sense,	since	“the	right	to	the	city	legitimates	the	refusal	to	allow	oneself	to	be	removed	




city	 model	 leads	 to	 access	 and	 benefits	 for	 a	 privileged	 sector	 of	 the	 urban	 population.	 This	 is	
because	the	vision	of	what	a	smart	city	is,	is	largely	matched	to	the	aspirations	and	world	view	of	a	
particular	 set	 of	 actors	 and	 subset	 of	 the	 population	 (Vanolo,	 2014b).	 If	 we	 take	 a	 Feenbergian	
view,	then	 ‘involvement	with	a	technology	makes	certain	 interests	salient.	 […]	Once	enrolled	 in	a	
network	 individuals	 are	 motivated	 to	 address	 its	 failings	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 they	 also	 acquire	
potential	power	over	its	development’	(Feenberg,	2011,	p.5).	Technological	development	does	not	
in	 itself	 overcome	 the	 broader	 challenges	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 technical	 skills,	 poor	 economic	
opportunities,	 and	 existing	 democratic	 divides	 (Mossberger,	 Tolbert	 &	 Stansbury,	 2003).	 It	
privileges	 those	 who	 fit	 into	 that	 certain	 space	 while	 excluding	 those	 who	 cannot	 or	 will	 not	
conform.	 In	 the	 smart	 city,	 there	 is	 little	 space	 for	 anyone	 at	 the	margins	 to	 challenge,	 or	 even	
engage	with	the	actually	existing	smart	city.	That	 is	because	the	communities	 involved	often	 lack	
the	circumstances,	access,	and	the	understanding	of	the	importance	of	technology	for	empowering	
themselves,	 either	 as	 individuals	 or	 as	 a	 collective:	 they	 lack	 agency	 (Melgaco	 &	 Willis,	 2017).	
Rather	than	just	perpetuating	existing	divides	the	smart	city	can	reinforce	social	inequalities,	since	





urban	 regeneration	projects	 in	one	hundred	 Indian	cities	over	 the	 five	years	 from	2016.	Chennai	
was	one	of	the	first	nineteen	cities	chosen	in	the	SCM,	and	the	city	selected	the	neighbourhood	of	
















being	 conceived	 and	 implemented	 in	 practice.	 The	 workshops	 had	 two	 modes	 of	 enquiry:	 a	







in	 Chennai,	 local	 NGOs,	 academics,	 community	 IT	 organisations,	 architects,	 economists,	 urban	
planners	and	also	representatives	from	the	India	National	Street	Hawkers	Association.	In	particular,	
two	things	became	clear:	very	few	organisations	or	people	knew	of	the	actual	detail	of	the	Chennai	
Smart	 City	 plan;	 and	 the	 Chennai	 Plan	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 re-purposing	 of	 the	 JNURM,	 a	 previous	
failed	 urban	 regeneration	 project	 (DASH,	 2014).	 The	 second	 workshop	 consisted	 of	 a	 one-day	
mapping	 exercise	 where	 a	 group	 of	 approximately	 fifteen	 stakeholders	 visited	 the	 designated	 T	
Nagar	 area	 to	 map	 the	 area	 to	 be	 implemented	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Chennai	 smart	 city	 plan.	 The	
participants	 included	 architects,	 community	 activists,	 local	 academics	 and	 the	 research	 network	
partners.	 The	 mapping	 exercise	 was	 meant	 to	 prompt	 participants	 to	 look	 at	 street	 level	











as	outlined	 in	 the	Smart	City	Chennai	documents,	 is	 through	the	optimisation	and	automation	of	
utilities	 (power,	waste	 and	water),	 transport	 and	 ICT	 infrastructure.	 The	 stated	 rationale	 for	 the	
Smart	 City	 Mission	 in	 Chennai	 is	 very	 much	 along	 typical	 lines	 of	 urban	 crisis,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	
infrastructure:		
	Chennai’s	 infrastructure	 is	 under	 constant	 strain.	 Traffic	 bottlenecks,	 restricted	 civic	
amenities	 and	 high	 pollution	 are	 all	 characteristics	 of	 this	 strain	 on	 infrastructure	
(Ministry	of	Urban	Development,	2016)	
The	 approach	 adopted	 uses	 this	 rationale	 to	 implement	 a	 technological	 management	 of	 these	
apparent	 ‘crisis’	 points	 in	 the	urban	 infrastructure.	 The	efficiency	paradigm	adopts	 the	approach	
that	current	people-centred	services	are	not	only	inefficient	and	unreliable;	they	are	also	not	under	
control.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 compare	 the	 proposed	 initiatives	 in	 the	 Smart	 City	 Chennai	











premised	 on	 the	 use	 of	 meters	 and	 sensors	 to	 control	 utility	 flows.	 They	 fail	 to	 address	 the	
availability	of	these	services	for	sections	of	the	population.		
	 Water	supply	is	a	challenge	across	India;	in	Chennai	more	than	15%	of	households	do	not	





























In	 the	 street,	 India	 has	 a	 remarkably	 localized	 infrastructure	 for	 power	 supply:	 transformers	 are	
located	outside	building	blocks	and	much	 cabling	 is	 accessible,	 so	 that	power	grids	are	 local	 and	











The	 pattern	 is	 replicated	 in	 the	 waste	 management	 proposals	 (see	 Table	 3).	 RFID	 chips	 are	
proposed	 for	solid	waste	management.	This	 is	a	 solution	being	delivered	by	a	 technology	vendor	
and	requires	a	‘control	room’	setup	where	full	rubbish	bins	are	reported	through	the	system	which	
then	activates	a	rubbish	collection.	Yet,	 rubbish	collection	 in	Chennai	 is	a	people-centred	service;	
involving	both	formal	and	informal	labour	at	a	neighbourhood	and	even	street	scale.	By	automating	
this	service,	 it	might	create	efficiencies	by	reducing	formal	sector	 labour	costs	but,	as	 it	has	been	
found	 in	 previous	 projects,	 “expensive	 technologies	 create	 reverse	 institutional	 and	 systemic	
linkages	 that	drive	out	 the	 informal	 sector	 in	order	 to	pay	 for	 themselves”	 (CWG;	GIZ.,	 2011).	 In	







centric	 systems	 into	 services	 that	 are	 controlled	 and	 managed	 through	 automated	 and	 often	
privatized	 service	 pathways.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 informal	 economy	 and	 management	 of	 urban	
infrastructure	 at	 street	 level	 are	 effectively	 replaced	 by	 sensors	 and	 a	 centralized	 management	











where	 “differences	 encounter,	 acknowledge,	 and	 explore	 one	 another,	 and	 affirm	 or	 cancel	 out	
one	another”	(Lefebvre,	1996b).	
	 The	 street	 space	 accommodates	 street	 traders,	 rickshaw	 drivers,	 shoppers	 and	 a	 whole	
range	 of	 informal	 economic	 activities.	 Although	 not	 explicit	 in	 the	 smart	 city	 proposals,	 what	
became	clear	from	a	more	detailed	reading	was	that	they	constituted	an	urban	‘cleansing’	strategy	
that	 involved	 the	 exclusion	 from	 the	 public	 space	 of	 street	 traders,	 informal	 taxis	 and	 other	
workers	 in	 the	 informal	economy.	For	example,	 street	vendors,	 in	particular,	 are	articulated	as	a	
problem	and	the	proposals	 include	moving	the	traders	en-masse	 into	a	separate	building	 located	
out	 of	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 T	 Nagar	 district,	 quite	 literally	 displacing	 them	 from	 the	 centre	 to	 the	
periphery.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 National	 Hawkers	 Federation	 had	 sought	 to	 mobilise	 its	 40	










Smart	 City	 Chennai	 proposals	 treat	 informal	 traders	 as	 ‘encroachments’	 in	 the	 urban	 space	 and	









fail	 to	 recognize	 or	 give	 value	 to	 the	 existing	 urban	 informality,	 where	 “informality	 must	 be	
understood	as	an	idiom	of	urbanization,	a	logic	through	which	differential	spatial	value	is	produced	
and	managed”	 (Roy	&	AlSayyad,	 2011,	 p.233).	 They	 are	 driven	 and	 rationalized	 by	 technological	
quick	 fixes	 and	 technologically	 deterministic	 plan-making	 (Graham	 &	 Marvin,	 2001).	 Urban	
informality	is	treated	as	a	set	of	conditions	and	resources	that	are	equivalent	to	‘leaks’	in	a	system	




Chennai	 in	 the	 past	 three	 years.	 ‘“The	 Central	 government	 has	 given	 nod	 for	 173	









citizens	 are	 to	 play	 in	 their	 conception,	 development	 and	 governance”.	 The	 technology	 and	
governance	 model	 that	 underpins	 many	 smart	 technologies	 is,	 in	 fact,	 full	 of	 potential	 for	
marginalized	 groups	 –	 it	 is	 accessible,	 cheap	 and	 localized,	 utilising	 low	 cost	 sensors,	 cheap	
connectivity	 and	 shared	 data	 assets.	 If	 it	 wants	 to	 recognize	 the	 social	 capital	 of	 marginalized	
groups	 then	 it	 needs	 to	 involve	 not	 only	 engineers,	 coders	 or	 systems	 scientists	 “but	 also	 civic	
hacktivists,	local	associations	and	longstanding	community	groups	that	make	up	civic-cyber	space”	










the	 general	 public	 behind	 the	 curtain	 of	 the	 smart	 city	 story	 and	 reveals	 the	workings	 of	 smart	
technologies	and	infrastructures	and	that	outlines	some	of	the	potential	benefits.	In	doing	so,	this	
would	 recognize	 and	 celebrate	 some	 of	 the	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 cities	 and	 people	 are	 already	
‘smart’,	but	which	have	not	been	given	that	name.	Where	cities	often	fail	at	smartness	is	in	the	role	
of	urban	planning,	which	inherently	implies	that	infrastructure	operates	only	to	meet	a	predefined	
and	 fairly	 linear	 service	 or	 provision.	 Smart	 cities,	 to	 some	 extent,	 operate	 on	 the	 fly;	 their	
coordination	based	on	resources	available	at	the	time	and	on	what’s	needed.	If	smart	cities	could	
enable	citizens	 to	 improvise	and	 to	 tinker	with	 their	workings,	 then	 this	 could	mark	a	 shift	 to	an	
‘actually	existing’	smart	city.	What	we	can	learn	from	the	Global	South	is	that	many	of	the	informal	
communities	that	operate	at	the	margins	have	developed	exceptionally	resourceful	and	innovative	










Cooper	 (intern).	 The	 report	 produced	 from	 the	 workshop	 is	 available	 here:	
https://whosesmartcity.net/publications-and-outcomes/	 which	 was	 researched	 and	 documented	
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